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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No, 950214-CA
Priority No. 2

vs.

Oral argument requested

JOSEPH TRUELOVE WILSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for burglary of a
dwelling, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah
Code Ann. (1953 as amended), a felony of the second degree; two
counts of assault, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section
102, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), Class B misdemeanors and
Violation of Spouse Abuse Protection Order, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 5, Section 108, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), a
Class A misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge
presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 950214-CA
Priority No. 2

vs.
JOSEPH TRUELOVE WILSON
Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdicl

onferred mi thin- i inn I by Tit le 'M

Chapter 2a, Section 3 (2)(f) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended),
which

grants

Appeal

original

appellate

• -

degree felonies.

jurisdiction
-

to

the Court

except capital a nil

of

fiisl

The appellant was convicted of burglary of a

dwelling, a second degree felony, two counts of assault, Class B

:n:i i s d e m e a n o i s

ai i ell c i le

I i } 11.11 a 1 1 oi i

i >11111

it

r \ Spouse

Abuse

Protection Order, a Class A misdemeanor.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The l.nl. Lov / i ny i i-fsues are presented foi leview in this brief:
"I Did the Court err in permitting the testimony of two
witnesses concerning statements by appellant?
Standard of review:

Where there is a claim of error by the trial

court

evidence, while considerable

in admitting

discretion

is

accorded the trial court, it is an ultimate question of law.
State v. Pena,

) When a challenge to a trial

court's decision concerns a question of law there is a review for
correctness. State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Ut.App 3 991)
1

2.

Was

the

court's

application

of

the

law

to

prevent

questioning a witness about relevant evidence erroneous?
Standard of review: Appellant incorporates the standard of review
for issue number one.

3. Was there insufficient evidence to support appellant's
conviction for assault of Lisa Wilson?
Standard of review: Viewing evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn

from

it, reversal

is warranted

when such evidence

is

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds would
have a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the crime. Claims
of insufficiency of the evidence require defendant to marshall
evidence which supports the verdict and demonstrate why the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. State v. Caver,
814 P.2d, 604 (Ut.App. 1991); State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah
1994)
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Appearing in Addendum A to this brief are the following:
Article I Section 7
Amendment XIV

Constitution of Utah

Constitution of the United States

Rule 401 Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 402 Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1

l

of Title 76, Chapter

6

Section 202 Utah Code Ann ,(1953 as

amended), burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony; two
C

i

I in 1

I I * i i i 1 1 il mi 1

Utah Code Ann.

mi in in

(1953

(mi mi

1

*

amended),

III a s s B mi sdemeanors and

Violation of Spouse Abuse Protection Order,

violation of Title

7 6, CI: lapt e i 5, Sec: t: I oi i ] 08, Utah Code Ann,
Class

misdemeanor

Appellant

was

originally

aggravated burglary, a first degree felony
78r Chapter "
was

with

.* s amended ), bi it

offense, aforesaid.

Appellant was originally charged with stalking
chapter

charged

in violation of

Jection 106.5 Utah Code Ann,

(i Q ^3 as

amended), a Class B misdemeanor. That charge was dismissed at the
preliminary hearing on October 13, 1994.
The trial was before a jury, commencing on December *

1QQyI

Appellant was sentenced on March 13, 1995 to a term In the
Utah State Prison n!

i
l Ifv.

I I in 111 i n in

1I1

inn i n

»* ^

*•

(15) years, which sentence runs consecutively with the concurrent
terms of incarceration for assault (six (6) months) and Violation
of Spouse Abuse Protection Ordei 1 I 1 J 1 IMNH (II,11) months).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 20, 1995.

3

- ), a

* violation of Title

Sec 11,. 11 .'" < I ! Utah Code Ann. (

found guilty of the lesser included

TI L i *:

» i «11. ai <

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 11, 1994, in Salt Lake County, at the residence
of Lisa Wilson, appellant was accused in an Information with
entering or remaining unlawfully, with the intent to commit an
assault. Present at the residence were Lisa Wilson and a friend,
Willey McDonald. McDonald testified that between 8:30 or 9:00 p.m.,
he heard a loud crash at a window in the residence (R.479).
McDonald observed appellant coming through a room in the house.
Appellant attempted to strike McDonald and a fight between the two
men ensued.(R pg. 482-488)
McDonald observe appellant exit out the back door, whereupon
McDonald picked up a hammer and went outside of the dwelling. After
making a threatening comment, appellant left the area (R 488-489).
Lisa Wilson testified that during the fight between the two
men, she exited the residence while calling the 911 operator on a
cordless phone (R pg 517-518). Appellant came up to this witness
and "grabbed the back of my dress" (R 519). Wilson observed a
neighbor, Steven Baeder, holding appellant while McDonald exited
the residence. While Lisa Wilson was still talking on the phone,
appellant left the area (R 521).
Steven Baeder testified that, having heard a window break in
the Wilson residence, he went over to that home. Stepping inside
the door, he saw appellant and Lisa Wilson. He went back outside
with Wilson, followed by appellant. He observed appellant "grabbing
Lisa's arm with that hand and wouldn't let her go" (R 571). Baeder
then "grabbed Joe from behind and kind of gave him a bearhug and
4

told him to let go..."(R 571).
The State's Prosecutor filed a motion to limit the scope of
cross-examination.

(R 70)

The State wanted

to limit cross-

examination of Lisa Wilson regarding her activity and state of
dress prior to appellant entering the residence. The State argued,
in support of the motion, that such evidence was irrelevant and
that it was more prejudicial than probative and was offered for no
other purpose than to harass the witness.(R 440-442).
Appellant argued that what he saw in the bedroom caused him
concern for his children and that such evidence was relevant to his
state of mind in entering the home. (R 442-444)

The Court

determined to deny the motion insofar as it sought to prohibit
testimony about what appellant observed. However, if there was no
testimony or evidence that appellant could actually see into the
window then such evidence was not probative and questions regarding
the conduct of Lisa Wilson or her state of dress would not be
permitted.
THE COURT: Well, the ruling is that you can't
get into that line of questioning, whether
it's on cross-examination or on your own case
in chief unless there has been evidence in the
record that you could actually see into the
window and there were not draperies or
something else preventing that. That's t h e
ruling... Well, I am saying that there has to
be evidence that he could see into the window.
That's what I said. But if there is something
covering such that he cannot see, he cannot
claim that he had a state of mind about
something that he couldn't have seen at the
time. So there has to be evidence first that
he could see into the window. That's all.
Okay? That's the ruling. (R 445-446)

5

Appellant filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude evidence
that had not been previously supplied to defense counsel pursuant
to discovery requests. (R 103) This included testimony from two
witnesses. The first witness was Bruce Galton, a neighbor of Lisa
Wilson who was to testify regarding statements appellant made in
leaving the Wilson residence following the incident. (R 637)

The

second witness was Carol Pia, mother of Lisa Wilson, who would
testify that she recieved a telephone call in the late evening of
September 11, 1994, which was taperecorded, wherein appellant
indicated to her that "he said, I'm going to put an end to all of
this if I have to take all of you with me." (R 645)

Appellant

objected to the testimony of these witnesses on the grounds that
counsel had not been supplied with the information, pursuant to
discovery request, about the existence of these witnesses and their
testimony. (R 446-452) Those objections were renewed, appellant
further arguing that " the prejudicial nature of that evidence so
outweighs probative value. There is so much prejudice to Mr. Wilson
that they ought not be allowed to use it since they didn't provide
it." (R582-585)
The court determined to suppress this evidence and not permit
these witnesses to testify regarding appellant's statements.(R595)
The State requested a reconsideration of that ruling. (R 618) The
court did reconsider its previous ruling and determined to allow
the witnesses' to testify (R 624-627).
Following the testimony of those witnesses, appellant made a
Motion for Mistrial based on a failure by the State to provide
6

information pursuant to discovery and "the prejudicial value versus
the probative value of letting that in."

That motion was denied.

(R 648-650)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellant submits that the court erred in admitting evidence
and in preventing defendant from eliciting testimony. In the first
instance it was appropriate for appellant to inquire regarding the
conduct and state of dress of Lisa Wilson prior to his entry into
the home. That testimony from both Lisa Wilson and McDonald would
have been relevant regarding appellant's intent.
The testimony of Galton and Pia was irrelevant and, pursuant
to Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence, should have been suppressed as
the prejudicial effect of that testimony outweighed its probative
value.
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for
assault of Lisa Wilson because there was no evidence which showed
that appellant had attempted, with unlawful force and violence to
do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
DID THE COURT ERR IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY
OF TWO WITNESSES CONCERNING STATEMENTS BY
APPELLANT?
7

Two witnesses testified regarding statements appellant made
subsequent to the incident at the Wilson home. Bruce Galton
testified about a comment appellant made while leaving the scene of
the incident. As appellant walked passed Galton he yelled, "If I go
to jail, when I get out I'll kill you." (R 638)
Carol Pia, mother of Lisa Wilson, testified that later in the
evening of September 11th she recieved a telephone call from
appellant. During the course of that conversation, appellant
indicated to her that "I'm going to put an end to all of this if I
have to take all of you with me." (R 645)
Appellant objected to the testimony of the two witnesses on
the grounds that, pursuant to discovery requests, he had not been
supplied with the names of these witnesses and the substance of
their testimony. Also, appellant objected, pursuant to Rule 403
Utah Rules of Evidence, that this testimony was prejudicial and any
probative value which it had was outweighed by this prejudice.
The Court initially suppressed this evidence and would not
permit the testimony of these witnesses. However, it reversed
itself after the State's prosecutor submitted a copy of the opinion
in State v. Archuletta 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1993).
The thrust of this issue is whether the testimony of these two
witnesses should have been excluded because appellant was not
advised of their existence and the substance of their testimony or,
whether the relevance of their testimony was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.

8

First, the State failed to disclose to appellant that there
were two witnesses to testify regarding statements appellant made
following the incident at the Wilson home. In State v. Knight 734
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), the State failed to disclose statements from
two witnesses and their unanticipated testimony. The court erred in
not continuing the trial or granting a mistrial. This failure
constituted an abuse of discretion warranting a reversal. That
error is considered of such prejudice that reversal is required if
there is a demonstration that without

the error there is a

reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. (Refer Knight,
supra, at pg 919-921)
In this case, the State failed to adequately inform appellant
of the existence of these two witnesses. It was not until the eve
of trial that an attempt was made by the State to inform appellant.
Appellant indicated to the Court that there was insufficient time
to adequately investigate and be prepared. What little time existed
for such investigation was further shortened by the reversal of the
initial ruling by the Court.
In reversing itself and allowing the witnesses to testify, the
Court speculated that this further investigation by appellant was
unnecessary. This was based on the speculative assumption that
there was nothing

to investigate. But, especially

given the

relationship of Carol Pia to Lisa Wilson, that assumption was
misplaced. Pretrial strategy and trial preparation were effected.
It is irrelevant to speculate about the results of further defense
investigation about these witnesses. If their testimony impacted on
9

a crucial aspect of the trial, then appellant should have been
given an adequate opportunity to undermine this evidence. It is in
this failure to give such an opportunity,

regardless of the

results, wherein lies the Court's error.
Secondly, and in the alternative, the Court erred in allowing
this testimony because it was either irrelevant (Rule 401 and 402),
or probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.(Rule 403)

Appellant's statements

were made following the incident. In one instance immediately
thereafter and in another instance, some time had elapsed. Both
statements indicated that appellant was mad and threatening action
but not directly related to the allegations of the charges for
which he was being tried. These statements were indications of
appellant's state of mind

following the incident

as much as

speculation concerning his state of mind and intent prior to or
during the incident. Thus, they are either irrelevant or serve to
prejudice

the

jury.

Their

probative

value

in

demonstrating

appellant' s state of mind in relation to the elements of the
offenses charged were outweighed by this prejudice.

POINT II
WAS THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO
PREVENT QUESTIONING A WITNESS ABOUT RELEVANT
EVIDENCE ERRONEOUS?
The State's prosecutor filed a Motion in Limine to prevent
appellant from questioning Lisa Wilson or Willey McDonald regarding
10

the activity of these two people and state of dress prior to
appellant entering the residence. Appellant contended that he had
observed these two people having sexual intercourse and Lisa Wilson
partially undressed as he looked through the window to the bedroom.
This was the reason he entered the home, believing that this was an
inappropriate

activity

while his children

were

present.

The

argument was that such evidence reflected on the victim's character
and was, consequently, irrelevant to the elements of the offenses
charged.[Refer R 070-074; State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah
1989)]
Appellant argued that this evidence was relevant to show his
intention and state of mind in entering the residence. The argument
was

that

appellant

intended

to

rescue

his

children

from a

detrimental environment which had been created by Lisa Wilson and
McDonald, the inference being that appellant did not intend to
commit an assault, but rather to intercede in an inappropriate
activity.
The trial Court, apparently, agreed that this evidence was
relevant to appellant's state of mind. However, the Court erred in
imposing a condition precedent to its introduction. The Court
required that there be a demonstration, even before the testimony
of these witnesses, that appellant could see in the window and view
the activity of which he complained. This condition precedent
imposed an impossible burden on appellant and effectively precluded
him from introducing this evidence.

11

POINT III
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR THE ASSAULT OF LISA
WILSON?

In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, great deference is
paid

to

the

jury

verdict.

From

the

evidence

and

reasonable

inferences drawn from it, all the elements of the crime must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the verdict. (Refer
State v. Jiron 882 P.2d 685 (UT. App. 1994); State v. Goddard 871
P.2d 540 (Utah 1994); State v. James 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1981);
State v. Gardener 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989).
Count

III

of

the

Information

charged

appellant

with

a

violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended), alleging that he assaulted Lisa Wilson by attempting,
with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson
(R 08).
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended), defines assault as an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence,

to do bodily

injury

to another.

The probable

cause

statement contained in the Information alleged that "Mrs. Wilson
suffered lacerations on her back and arms, ...."(R 010)

At trial,

however, testimony was deficient in proving this assault and the
alleged

injuries

sustained

by

Mrs.

Wilson.

Willey

McDonald

testified that following the altercation with him in the house,
appellant left and McDonald went to the kitchen where he picked up
a hammer.

He then went outside and saw the next door neighbor and
12

appellant holding Lisa Wilson's dress at the back area. (R 488-489;
507).
Lisa

Wilson

altercation

testified

between

that

appellant

and

during

the

McDonald,

course
she

of

the

exited

the

residence out the back door while talking on the phone with the 911
operator. Appellant then ran up to her and grabbed the back of her
dress indicating concern for his children who were in the house. (R
518-519).
Steven Baeder testified,
A:
Well, I got to the door and she opened up
the door and came running out. I stepped
inside the door and looked up a half flight of
stairs at the Lisa and saw Joe Wilson at the
top of the landing with blood on his face.
Then I went back outside with Lisa and Joe
followed us. He, with one hand --I could only
see one hand as I recall— he was grabbing
Lisa's arm with that hand and wouldn't let her
go.
I grabbed Joe from behind and kind of gave him
a bearhug and told him to let go and said,
Joe, this isn't doing any good. And he
wouldn't let go for a minute or two or so. And
finally Lisa got away. And then I let go of
Joe." (R 571)
It was incumbent on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that appellant, knowingly and intentionally, attempted with
unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lisa Wilson. The
facts, through the testimony of these witnesses, are totally
deficient in proving the essential elements of that offense. The
clear indication from this testimony is that, rather than intend to
attempt to do bodily injury, appellant was intending to attempt to
restrain Wilson in order to either confront her with his concern
13

for the children or prevent her from continuing the telephone
conversation.(Refer R 650-653)
The statute requires more than an indication of intent to
commit an act of physical violence whose object is to cause bodily
injury. There must also be evidence that an attempt was made to do
bodily injury. This includes not only the mental element but also
a physical action.
It is speculation that appellant intended, at any point during
the incident, to cause Lisa Wilson bodily injury. However, the
evidence is void of any indication that appellant attempted to do
bodily injury. Holding on to the dress or arm leaves considerable
room for doubt as to whether this amounts to some attempt to
inflict injury.
Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to convict
appellant

of this assault because there is reasonable doubt

concerning appellantf s intent and whether he attempted to do bodily
inj ury.
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument in this matter as it would be
helpful to clarify the issues in this case.

CONCLUSION
Testimony of two witnesses was permitted over objection to a
violation of discovery

requests and its probative value was

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Appellant was improperly
precluded from introducing relevant evidence regarding intent and
14

state of mind and there was insufficient evidence to support
appellant's conviction for assault of Lisa Wilson.
Count III of the Information should be dismissed because of
insufficient evidence and the other charges should be reversed and
*

remanded for a new trial.

DATED this

ITL

day of

j\A Jy

, 1995.

Respectfully sutpitted,

JOSEPH C. FRATT<OV'<JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the forgoing Brief of
Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this
, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of lawEqual protection.]
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE ANN.
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.

Rule

402, Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissable.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provide by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

